The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil

Bibliographic Data

ID6300940
AuthorsScott W Desposato, Scott Desposato (0000-0001-7722-1766, University of Arizona, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume29
Issue2
Pages259-285
Publication date2004-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3162/036298004x201177
OpenAlexW2039912540
LanguageEN
Citations received55
References cited32

This article explores the impact of federalism on national party cohesion. Although credited with increasing economic growth and managing conflict in countries with diverse electorates, federal forms of government have also been blamed for weak party systems because national coalitions may be divided by interstate conflicts. This latter notion has been widely asserted, but there is virtually no empirical evidence of the relationship or even an effort to isolate and identify the specific features of federal systems that might weaken parties. In this article, I build and test a model of federal effects in national legislatures. I apply my framework to Brazil, whose weak party system is attributed, in part, to that country's federal form of government. I find that federalism does significantly reduce party cohesion and that this effect can be tied to multiple state‐level interests but that state‐level actors' impact on national party cohesion is surprisingly small

Cohesion (chemistry · Economics · Federalism · Government (linguistics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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