Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301068 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amy Melissa Mckay (0000-0002-4497-2456, University of Exeter, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 327-360 |
| Publication date | 2020-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12266 |
| OpenAlex | W2996611399 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 44 |
When do campaign contributions matter? This article advances the claim that a group that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. Using an original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a significant relationship between lobby groups' campaign contributions and their legislative success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group‐senator dyad. The relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amendments in committee. The rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups' legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies could not identify
Campaign finance · Economics · House of Representatives · Interest group · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Law · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Financiamiento de campañas y cabildeo
The strategic allocation of PAC funds to effective legislators
How interest groups discern serious legislation from position-taking
How to Cautiously Uncover the “Black Box” of Machine Learning Models for Legislative Scholars
Gift Travel in the U.S. House of Representatives
No Representation Without Compensation
Either with Us or Against Us
More than Mere Access
Lobbying responsiveness to congressional policy agendas
Shelter in a Storm
The Interest Group Society
American Public Opinion, Advocacy, and Policy in Congress
Lobbying and Policy Change
Basic Interests
Greasing the Wheels
Stata Tip 63
Home Style
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Lobbying influence
Some talk
Congress, The Electoral Connection
The European Commission's Online Consultations
The contextual nature of lobbying
Determinants of Upper-Class Dominance in the Heavenly Chorus
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on U.S. Trade Policy
Interest Group Influence in the U. S. Congress
Different Houses
Influence and the Administrative Process
Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives
Money and Access
Revolving Door Lobbyists and the Value of Congressional Staff Connections
Federalism and Health Care Reform
Shaping Health Reform
Before the Roll Call
Funding Mechanisms and Policy Instruments
Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits
PACs, Issue Context, and Congressional Decisionmaking
Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process
Foreign Interests Lobbying Brussels
Lobbying and Taxes
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials
Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures
Polarized Agents
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
Campaign Contributions and Legislative Outcomes
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |