The Logic of Legislative Leadership

Preferences, Challenges, and the Speaker's Powers

Bibliographic Data

ID6301334
AuthorsJesse Richman (0000-0002-5420-0521, Old Dominion University, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume35
Issue2
Pages211-233
Publication date2010-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3162/036298010791170169
OpenAlexW2120682548
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited31

Principal agent theory implies that legislators will delegate power to a leader only when they need the leader's help and the leader can be expected to provide satisfactory help if granted power. This study is the first to evaluate the implied interaction between legislators' need for help and the degree to which legislators and leaders have similar preferences. By analyzing the Speaker's powers in the U.S. states, I arrived at three key conclusions. First, institutional leadership power responds to the interaction between preference alignment and policymaking challenges. Traditionally expected effects only appear when both alignment and challenges are relatively high. Second, professionalization causes weaker leadership powers. Finally, electoral competition correlates with stronger appointment, committee, and resource powers, but weaker procedural powers

Competition (biology · Delegate · Economics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Power (physics · Preference · Principal (computer security · Public relations · Separation of powers · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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