Congressional Vote Options
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301455 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David C King (Harvard University), Richard Zeckhauser (0000-0002-4222-9546, Harvard University), Richard J Zeckhauser |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 387-411 |
| Publication date | 2003-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298003x200935 |
| OpenAlex | W3023024632 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 29 |
| References cited | 40 |
Numerous accounts reveal that congressional leaders often secure “hip‐pocket votes” or “if you need me” pledges from rank‐and‐file legislators. These are essentially options on votes. Leaders exercise sufficient options—pay legislators to convert to favorable votes—when those options will yield victory. Otherwise, they release the options. A model shows that this optimal strategy for leaders produces many small victories, few small losses, and losses that are, on average, larger than victories. We find precisely these patterns, hence strong evidence for vote options, in Congressional Quarterly key votes from 1975 through 2001 and in non‐key votes from the 106th Congress (1999–2000
Business · Political science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
The American Congress
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Party Influence in Congress
Setting the Agenda
Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress
Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods
Up the Hill and Across the Aisle
Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government
Vote Switching in the U.S. House
The Impact of Presidential Campaigning for Congress on Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives
Comparing Responsible Party Government in the United States and the United Kingdom
Who Heeds the Call of the Party in Congress
The President's Playbook
Coalition Formation in the House and Senate
Tests of Vote-Buyer Theories of Coalition Formation in Legislatures
Partisan vote buying and suspensions in the Postreform House
Long-Term Change and Stability in House Voting Decisions
Majority Party Strategy and Suspension of the Rules in the House
Tarnishing Opponents, Polarizing Congress
Strategic Party Government
Bribing Voters
The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress
Gerrymandering Roll Calls in Congress, 1879–2000
After Cloture
When Loyalty Is Tested
Conceptualizing vote buying
Facciosismo, Rachas Intrapartidários e Capacidade Decisória na Democracia Brasileira de 1946
Partidos Políticos e Governadores como Determinantes do Comportamento Legislativo na Câmara dos Deputados, 1988-2006
Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006
The president in the legislative arena
The theory of political coalitions.
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Information and Legislative Organization
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
The presidential power of unilateral action
On Buying Legislatures
Divided we govern
Home Style
Pivotal Politics
Policy views, constituency pressure, and congressional action on flag burning
Centralized vote-trading
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions
Strategic Vote Delay in the U. S. House of Representatives
Explaining Why Presidents Count
Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules
Mobilizing Congressional Support for the President
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Passing the President's Program
Coalition-Building by Party Leaders
Institutional Context and Leadership Style
Bargaining in Legislatures
Why are Congressional Committees Powerful
Buying Supermajorities
Building Presidential Coalitions Among Cross-Pressured Members of Congress
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics
The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress
Policy Making in Congressional Committees
On the Size of Winning Coalitions
Bargaining With the President
| Unique citing works | 29 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,32 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2024 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 29 |