Ideological polarization in roll call votes in constitutional conventions
The case of Chile in 2021–2
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6309342 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hernán Campos-Parra (0000-0002-5369-8102, Diego Portales University), Patricio Navia (0000-0001-9398-8393, Diego Portales University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 203-225 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Parliamentary Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-2290 • E-ISSN: 1460-2482 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pa/gsae009 |
| OpenAlex | W4396621224 |
| Language | IT |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 41 |
What factors account for polarization in constitutional conventions comprised of party members and many independents without prior legislative experience? Using the 4,669 roll call votes in the 155-member constitutional convention in Chile (2021–2), comprised of more independents than party members, we explore the determinants of ideological polarization. Relying on absolute values for the WNominate scores, we find that party members are less polarized than independents and that prior legislative experience does not impact polarization. In institutionalized party systems that allow independents to compete with party members on a level playing field, a larger presence of independents in legislatures might help increase ideological polarization while a larger number of party members helps reduce ideological polarization in roll call votes
Ideology · Polarization (electrochemistry · Political science · Politics · Roll call · Chemistry · Cultural and political discourse analysis · Law · Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America · Politics and Society in Latin America
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| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |