Grassroots lobbying in Germany
Are moderately and greatly supported public petitions effective
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6311190 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Maciej Olejnik (0000-0002-8697-3158, University of Wrocław, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 353-379 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-05 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Parliamentary Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-2290 • E-ISSN: 1460-2482 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pa/gsaf035 |
| OpenAlex | W4411046300 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
This paper investigates the effectiveness of a grassroots lobbying technique—public petitions—in Germany, applying the costly signaling theory and the economic theory of political information. I analyzed public petitions with at least 1,000 signatures, addressed by the Bundestag during its 19th term (2017–2021), and assessed the petitions’ issue salience for the ruling parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. The findings reveal that public petitions can be an effective grassroots lobbying technique, with 31% of them being fulfilled. The ruling parties’ endorsement of the issues raised in the petitions was a key factor in determining their effectiveness. Petitions addressing issues supported by both ruling parties were significantly more effective than those on issues opposed or ambiguously received by at least one ruling party. The study provides evidence supporting two key aspects of the economic theory of political information. First, the probability of fulfillment for petitions on higher salience issues supported by the ruling parties does not significantly differ between those with a large number of signatures (at least 50,000) and those with a moderate number (1,000 to 49,999). Moderately popular petitions on higher salience issues endorsed by CDU/CSU and SPD are nearly as effective as their more popular counterparts. Second, the probability of fulfillment for higher salience petitions opposed by the ruling parties also does not significantly differ between greatly and moderately popular petitions, as both were equally ineffective. Conversely, the study finds no strong support for the economic theory of political information’s assumption that moderately popular petitions on lower party salience issues should be more effective than greatly popular ones. In contrast, an in-depth analysis using a logistic regression model shows that the level of public support does not significantly impact the petitions’ effectiveness. This finding suggests that the costly signaling theory lacks explanatory power in the context of public petition effectiveness in Germany
Grassroots · Political science · Politics · Law · Public Administration
Lobbying and Policy Change
Outside Lobbying
‘Success’ and online political participation
When is grassroots lobbying effective? The case of the e-petitions at the national level in the UK
The digital divide has grown old
The value of ‘between-election’ political participation
The Interplay Between Digital and Political Divides
The Effectiveness of Grassroots Lobbying at the Regional Level in Poland
Interest Group Activity in the States
How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator Responsiveness
Parliamentary petitions and public engagement
Petitioning the German Bundestag
What Are Petitions Good for? Institutional Design and Democratic Functions
Process matters
Grass-roots lobbying and the provision of information-processing resources in state legislatures
Do Legislative Petitions Systems Enhance the Relationship between Parliament and Citizen
Voting Behaviour in the 19th German Bundestag and Beyond
Dynamic party unity
Does Grassroots Lobbying Work
| Highly cited | No |
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