Business, regulation and welfare politics in liberal capitalism

Bibliographic Data

ID6326362
AuthorsTraute Meyer (0000-0003-0767-8351, University of Southampton), Paul Bridgen (0000-0001-6039-3254, University of Southampton)
Year2012
Volume40
Issue3
Pages387-403
Publication date2012-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolicy & Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0305-5736 • E-ISSN: 1470-8442
PublisherBristol University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1332/030557312x645748
OpenAlexW1995449306
LanguageEN
Citations received10

Concerted support from business organisations for increased state welfare provision is unexpected in liberal capitalism, but in Britain this occurred prior to recent major reforms of pensions. Using Mares’ micro-theory of employer behaviour and studies of public/private mixes, this article shows that three umbrella organisations of employers and insurers supported higher state pensions because incremental state regulation of non-state provision over many decades and threats about even greater compulsion in the private sector had significantly reduced company control while increasing their costs. As a result, a higher state pension appeared more attractive to all business actors than further regulation of the private sphere. On this basis, we suggest that state regulation should be incorporated more firmly into theories of institutional development and interest formation in liberal regimes

Capitalism · Control (management · Economic growth · Economics · Management · Market economy · Pension · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Private sector · State (computer science · Welfare · Welfare state · Finance · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Social Policy and Reform Studies

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