Experimentalist Governance with Interactive Central–Local Relations

Making New Pension Policies in China

Bibliographic Data

ID6328339
AuthorsXufeng Zhu (0000-0002-8446-1183), Hui Zhao (0009-0002-8489-5747)
Year2021
Volume49
Issue1
Pages13-36
Publication date2021-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolicy Studies Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/psj.12254
OpenAlexW2792127450
LanguageEN
Citations received68
References cited62

Although regional policy experimentation has become a global trend, the distinct features of experimentalist governance in a given country, such as China, remains to be investigated. This article extends policy process theory by proposing the framework of experimentalist governance with interactive central–local relations or Chinese‐style experimentalist governance, which combines three features. First, policy goals and instruments are formed separately and interactively by the central and local governments. Second, the central government is burdened with its own concerns about policy performance for maintaining authority and legitimacy. Third, the evaluation of policy pilots relies primarily on the responses of local governments. We further conceptualize three new patterns of experimentalist governance in China, namely, “comparative trial,” “selective recognition,” and “adaptive reconciliation,” in addition to “hierarchical experimentation.” These patterns are illustrated with case studies on four pension policies in China, which are for public sector employees, urban employees, rural residents, and migrant workers

Central government · China · Corporate governance · Economics · Government (linguistics · Legitimacy · Local government · Management · Pension · Political science · Public policy · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Urban Planning and Governance

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