More than agents
Federal bureaucrats as information suppliers in policymaking
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6328529 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jobeth S Shafran (0000-0002-1471-9564, Political Science and Public Affairs Western Carolina University Cullowhee North Carolina USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 921-943 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/psj.12455 |
| OpenAlex | W4200056610 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 41 |
Bureaucrats are frequently conceptualized as agents of Congress, with much focus placed on their expertise as policy implementers or evaluators. That same expertise, though, allows bureaucrats to supply Congress with information throughout the policy process. Bureaucrats are just one of the many actors that compete to supply Congress with information to define problems and develop solutions. Congressional committees must prioritize all available information, deciding what to attend and what to ignore. I argue that bureaucrats are more likely to testify at hearings when there is (1) limited availability of alternative information sources, (2) the information they hold is necessary for achieving committee goals or tasks (ex. agency oversight), and (3) the information they have can alleviate diverse committee workloads. Using a new dataset of witnesses testifying at congressional committee hearings, I find that the prioritization of bureaucrats as witnesses is explainable in terms of policy area, committee type, and committee agenda
Agency (philosophy · Business · Political science · Prioritization · Process (computing · Process management · Public relations · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Multiple Streams and Plausibility Cones
Talking at parties
Information use in public administration and policy decision‐making
The influence of conflict on agenda setting in the US Congress
Regulation timing in the states
The voice of implementation
Big & rich
The politics of problems versus solutions
Expertise for emerging technology
Order Without Design
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Committees in Congress
The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government
Learning While Governing
The Gingrich Senators
Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise
Turf Wars
Policy change and learning
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
Interest Organizations, Information, and Policy Innovation in the U.S. Congress 1 2
Expert‐Based Information and Policy Subsystems
The Politics of Information
The Administrative Broker
An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein
The New American State
The Variable Politics of the Policy Process
Organizing Attention
The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions
Up in Smoke
Information Processing and Policy Dynamics
Widespread Policy Disruption and Interest Mobilization
Trends and Innovations in Public Policy Analysis
Rethinking Bureaucrats in the Policy Process
The Politics of Attention
Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional Hearings
Reconsidering Policy Design
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research
Issue expertise in policymaking
American Bureaucracy in a Changing Political Setting
Bounded Rationality and Political Science
Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy
Information and Congressional Hearings
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |