New Evidence for the Theory of Groups

Trade Association Lobbying in Washington, D.C

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6339477
AutoresJeffrey Drope (0000-0003-0147-9722, Marquette University), Jeffrey M Drope (Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,), Wendy L Hansen (0000-0002-5964-2564, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,)
Año2009
Volumen62
Número2
Páginas303-316
Fecha de publicación2009-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912908319254
OpenAlexW2024007403
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas44

Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. Accordingly, this research addresses the original theoretical propositions by examining industry associations' political activity nationally. Some forty years after the formulation of the theoretical argument, we find evidence supporting the logic of collective action. More concentrated industries are likelier to have politically active associations than more competitive industries

Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Collective action · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Corporate Finance and Governance · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies