Contradictory Calculi
Differences in Individuals’ Turnout Decisions across Electoral Systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6340565 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Swaran P Singh (0000-0003-3263-5281, McGill University, corresponding author), Shane Singh (McGill University) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 646-655 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912909357177 |
| OpenAlex | W1991634631 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 41 |
Existing theories of turnout model individuals’ decisions to vote as a function of the utility they would gain from their favored party’s election, the costs of voting, and the intrinsic benefits associated with democratic participation. This project shows that such utility calculations are conditional on electoral rules. In electoral systems with low incentives for strategic behavior, the traditional model of voter turnout is accurate. However, in plurality systems, in which there are stronger incentives for individuals to abandon their true preferences, less importance is placed on the utility associated with the possible success of favored parties
Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Democracy · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Function (biology · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Turnout · Voter turnout · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Covid-19 pandemic and political participation in Lagos, Nigeria
Political Systems and Electoral Behavior
Regions as Primary Political Communities
Linear and quadratic utility loss functions in voting behavior research
Irrationalizing the rational choice model of voting
Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality
Participation in America
Making Votes Count
Electoral Systems and Party Systems
A Unified Theory of Party Competition
The American Voter Revisited
To Vote or Not to Vote
The political consequences of electoral laws
An economic theory of democracy
Electoral Engineering
Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945
Patterns of democracy
A strategic calculus of voting
Political Parties
Stability in Competition
Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence
Making Democracy Work
Simulating Models of Issue Voting
Understanding Interaction Models
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms
Values and partisanship in left‐right orientations
Does proportional representation foster voter turnout
Effective” Number of Parties
Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies during the 1980s
What Affects Voter Turnout
Toward a New Political Methodology
Beliefs and Voting Decisions
Coalition‐Targeted Duvergerian Voting
Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems
Who are the spatial voting violators
Electoral institutions and popular confidence in electoral processes
Turnout around the globe
When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties
Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85
Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2021 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |