A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection

Bibliographic Data

ID6341638
AuthorsJim Duggan (0000-0001-8554-2594, corresponding author), John Duggan
Year2014
Volume2
Issue2
Pages213-242
Publication date2014-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2014.4
OpenAlexW1986124336
LanguageEN
References cited21

This article establishes a folk theorem for a model of repeated elections with adverse selection: when citizens (voters and politicians) are sufficiently patient, arbitrary policy paths through arbitrarily large regions of the policy space can be supported by a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Politicians are policy motivated (so office benefits cannot be used to incentivize policy choices), the policy space is one-dimensional (limiting the dimensionality of the set of utility imputations), and politicians’ preferences are private information (so punishments cannot be targeted to a specific type). The equilibrium construction relies critically on differentiability and strict concavity of citizens’ utility functions. An extension of the arguments allows policy paths to depend on the office holder's type, subject to incentive compatibility constraints

Adverse selection · Computer security · Curse of dimensionality · Differentiable function · Economics · Equilibrium selection · Folk theorem · Game theory · Incentive · Incentive compatibility · Limiting · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Private information retrieval · Pure mathematics · Repeated game · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Artificial Intelligence

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