Can followers detect political leaders who cheat? Testing an evolutionary position

Bibliographic Data

ID6341989
AuthorsYi Yang (0000-0002-9729-8522, Beijing Municipal Government), Meng Liang (0000-0003-1641-485X), Liang Meng (0000-0002-0470-7818, Beijing Municipal Government, corresponding author), B Wang (0000-0002-7170-0835, Peking University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-18
Publication date2025-06-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2025.10012
OpenAlexW4411373538
LanguageEN
References cited51

Researchers applying evolutionary theory to political psychology discover that in democracies, most citizens struggle to select political leaders based on their ideologies. Rather, they tend to concentrate on procedural fairness during public decision-making when evaluating their leaders. We re-examine such evolutionary propositions in China using eight Wason selection experiments. In autocracies, where accountability systems are weak or absent, little is known about how citizens judge politicians’ ideologies and their cheating behaviors. Our findings show that Chinese citizens are incapable of identifying political leaders’ ideological orientations; instead, they rely on a cheater-detection mechanism, evaluating leaders based on their adherence to procedural fairness. These results contribute to our understanding of democratic competence and the cognitive mechanisms of political judgment in autocratic contexts

Economics · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Positive economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Finance

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