Failing International Climate Politics and the Fairness of Going First
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6345849 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Maltais (0000-0003-4557-0069, Uppsala University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 618-633 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.12073 |
| OpenAlex | W1526282499 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 42 |
There appear to be few ways available to improve the prospects for international cooperation to address the threat of global warming within the very short time frame for action. I argue that the most effective and plausible way to break the ongoing pattern of delay in the international climate regime is for economically powerful states to take the lead domestically and demonstrate that economic welfare is compatible with rapidly decreasing GHG emissions. However, the costs and risks of acting first can be very large. This raises the question of whether it is fair to expect some states to go far ahead of others in an effort to improve the conditions for cooperation. I argue that a costly obligation to act unilaterally and to accept weak initial reciprocity can be justified and does not violate standards of fair burden sharing. Rather, the costs of creating the underlying conditions within which we can hope to achieve meaningful international cooperation are non-ideal burdens for which we can appropriately assign fair shares
Economics · Greenhouse gas · International Action · Law and economics · Market economy · Obligation · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Sociology · Welfare · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Law · Public health and occupational medicine
Unilateral Action on Climate Change and the Moral Obligation to Take Leadership
Moral duties, compliance and polycentric climate governance
Stepping in for the Polluters? Climate Justice under Partial Compliance
Political Theory
Climate justice after Paris
Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations
Non-ideal climate justice
Two Kinds of Climate Justice
When Are Carbon Border Adjustment Measures Just
Dramaturgies of change
Global Warming Gridlock
Governing the Commons
Global Collective Action
A Perfect Moral Storm
Protecting the Ozone Layer
EU Leadership in International Climate Policy
Historical Emissions and Free-Riding
National Responsibility and Global Justice
Justification and Legitimacy
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory
Protecting the Ozone Layer
Climate justice
Looking for Leaders
Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations
Climate Change Governance after Bali
The European Union as an environmental leader in a global environment
Climate change and the duties of the advantaged
Global justice, climate change and Miller’s theory of responsibility
Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change
Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change
Constituting Global Leadership
Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism
On the Confusion Between Ideal and Non-Ideal in Recent Debates on Global Justice
The Real Tragedy of the Commons
Ideal and Nonideal Theory
The Regime Complex for Climate Change
Climate Change and Global Citizenship
Justice in adaptation to climate change
Distributing the burdens of climate change
Global warming and the cosmopolitan political conception of justice
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |