Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Central Banking in Rawls’s Property-Owning Democracy

Bibliographic Data

ID6350033
AuthorsJens Van ’t Klooster (0000-0002-0796-9311, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy and University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume47
Issue5
Pages674-698
Publication date2019-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0090-5917 • E-ISSN: 1552-7476
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0090591718810377
OpenAlexW2904867865
LanguageEN
Citations received7

The dramatic events of the crisis have reignited debates on the independence of central banks and the scope of their mandates. In this article, I contribute to the normative understanding of these developments by discussing John Rawls’s position in debates of the 1950s and 1960s on the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Rawls’s account of the central bank in his property-owning democracy, Democratic Central Banking (DCB), assigns authority over monetary policy directly to the government and prioritizes low unemployment over price stability. I contrast DCB with Central Bank Independence (CBI), which requires that the central bank is independent of the government and pursues low inflation. I evaluate DCB by asking whether justice as fairness requires democratic control of the central bank and argue that it does not. Instead, so I argue, the choice between DCB and CBI should be justified in terms of the difference principle. By reflecting on central banking in a property-owning democracy, I cast new light on the Rawlsian realistic utopia of a just capitalist society, while also investigating democratic objections to today’s independent central banks

Central government · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Independence (probability theory · Law and economics · Local government · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Property (philosophy · Economic Theory and Institutions · Economic Theory and Policy · Law · Philosophy

  • Distributive Justice, Political Legitimacy, and Independent Central Banks

    Open Access•Josep Ferret Mas•Res Publica. Revista de Historia…•2023

  • Delegation in Democracy

    Open Access•Leah Downey•Journal of Political Philosophy•2020

  • The environmental counter-history of liberalism

    Open Access•Floren Matthews•History of the Human Sciences•2024

  • Is Money a Public Good

    Open Access•Chiara Cordelli•The Review of Politics•2025

  • Monetary-policy delegation for democrats

    Clemens Pinnow•Critical Review of International…•2022

  • The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy

    Jens Van ’t Klooster•The Journal of Politics•2020

  • Citizen Tax Juries

    Open Access•Gordon Arlen•Political Theory•2022

Unique citing works7
Citations per year1,17
Citation span2020 - 2025 (6)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 7

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae