Monetary-policy delegation for democrats
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6420976 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Clemens Pinnow (0000-0002-9741-0430, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 215-237 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-8230 • E-ISSN: 1743-8772 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13698230.2022.2108228 |
| OpenAlex | W4292104449 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 26 |
Independent central banks are major centres of unelected power in contemporary capitalist societies. While critics allege that they are incompatible with democratic values, defenders argue that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is an important policy tool elected institutions may use to credibly commit to low inflation. This paper defends a moderate view that neither requires dismantling central bank independence nor turns a blind eye to its risks for the proper functioning of a democratic regime. It proposes a set of concrete constitutional rules that limit central bank power while allowing it to serve its core function
Central bank · Commit · Delegation · Democracy · Economics · Function (biology · Independence (probability theory · Keynesian economics · Law and economics · Monetary policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Economic Theory and Policy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
Justice as Fairness
Regulating Europe
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
The Core of the Case against Judicial Review
Beyond Fairness and Deliberation
Justice for Hedgehogs
The Constitution of Equality
A Theory of Justice
On Tolerating the Unreasonable
Rules Rather than Discretion
Central banking and inequalities
The Ethics of Delegating Monetary Policy
Central Banking in Rawls’s Property-Owning Democracy
Bank on Democracy
Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy
Ulysses Unbound
Governing by Panic
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |