A Political-Institutional Interpretation of Legislative Oversight Mechanisms & Behavior
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6356166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcus E Ethridge (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 340-359 |
| Publication date | 1984-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Polity (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3497 • E-ISSN: 1744-1684 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3234511 |
| OpenAlex | W2325614299 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
Rather unexpectedly, we have been hearing of a significant increase in oversight activity by members of Congress and state legislatures. Professor Ethridge attributes this development to changes in interest group politics that make certain kinds of oversight politically profitable. He goes on to argue that legislative committees charged with oversight are able to subdue opposition to their work by adopting institutional perspectives that both limit and legitimize their decisions
Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · State (computer science · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 1986 - 2023 (38) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |