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Can markets be expected to prevent themselves from self‐destruction

Bibliographic Data

ID6377016
AuthorsBo Rothstein
Year2011
Volume5
Issue4
Pages387-404
Publication date2011-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRegulation & Governance (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01108.x
OpenAlexW2132179105
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited56

Even if competitive markets have shown themselves to be the most efficient organizational form for creating economic efficiency, the question of how they can avoid destructive influence from agents with opportunistic motives remains unresolved. Different institutional approaches have argued that to be efficient, markets need to be embedded in a set of formal and informal institutions. Because such institutions will in the long run make all market agents better off, they are labeled efficient institutions. Contrary to what is argued in neoclassical economics, it is unlikely that such institutions will be created endogenously by market agents because the institutions are to be understood as genuine public goods. Moreover, if such institutions have been established, we should expect market agents to face a collective action problem when sustaining them, leading to the destruction of the institutions. The conclusion is that if left to themselves, markets should be understood as inherently self‐destructive

Action (physics · Business · Collective action · Economic efficiency · Economic system · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Industrial organization · Institutional economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Public good · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law

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Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,21
Citation span2012 - 2023 (12)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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