Skating on Thin Ice

Cracks in the Public Choice Foundation

Bibliographic Data

ID6298033
AuthorsNorman Frohlich (University of Manitoba, corresponding author), Joe Oppenheimer (0000-0001-7973-6173, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA;, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume18
Issue3
Pages235-266
Publication date2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629806064346
OpenAlexW2119711816
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited56

The behavioral assumptions upon which Public Choice, and Game Theory are built, are false. This may not seem to be ‘too serious’ since many theories are only approximations. But a broad spectrum of experimental results has shown the problem to be greater than one of workable proportions. We illustrate the problems by examining some anomalous results in both voluntary contribution games and dictator games. We argue that there are difficulties with both the content and structure of the preferences posited in the standard model, sketch the outlines of a possible solution, and discuss some of the implications of this new perspective for knowledge and theory construction

Dictator · Dictator game · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Positive economics · Public good · Sketch · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Artificial Intelligence

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