How Do Third Parties Affect Compliance in the Trade Regime
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6385228 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey Kucik (0000-0002-8184-9027, University of Arizona), Lauren Peritz (University of California, Davis) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1184-1189 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/711058 |
| OpenAlex | W3045634923 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 14 |
A core insight of the literature on dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that third party countries help enforce the organization’s multilateral objectives, including the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination. Little is known, however, about when countries comply with WTO rulings and whether these bystander states play a role. We introduce new data on compliance, measured as whether losing countries make tangible domestic reforms to bring policy in line with WTO rulings. We show that compliance is significantly less likely in disputes with more third parties. Using a variety of estimation techniques, including controlling for nonrandom selection into legal rulings, we demonstrate a robust correlation between third party participation and noncompliance. Our findings highlight a risk of stringent enforcement and suggest that compliance problems threaten to undercut the operation of the multilateral trade regime. © 2021 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved
Business · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · International economics · International trade · Political science · Third party · Variety (cybernetics · World trade · Global trade and economics · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Law · World Trade Organization Law
Competing State Interests and the Strategic Use of Advisory Proceedings
Monitoring by Monitoring
Token Forces
Generalizable Precedents at the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
Revisiting Embedded Liberalism
Do International Dispute Bodies Overreach? Reassessing World Trade Organization Dispute Ruling
The politics of rejection
Legalization and Compliance
Three's a Crowd
Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes
How Do Prior Rulings Affect Future Disputes
Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining
The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization
Leadership Turnover and the Durability of International Trade Commitments
Measuring the Cost of Privacy
Stability and Rigidity
| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |