How Do Prior Rulings Affect Future Disputes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6274188 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey Kucik (0000-0002-8184-9027, University of Arizona, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1122-1132 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqz063 |
| OpenAlex | W2969258763 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 63 |
International dispute systems are often designed so that dispute body rulings do not set precedent. Yet governments have incentives to learn from prior decisions. Past rulings convey important information about how the law is applied. This is especially true in the World Trade Organization (WTO), where disputes frequently occur between the same members and over the same issues. I argue that case law increases the likelihood of early settlement. This helps explain why fifty percent of WTO cases end prior to a formal ruling. I use new data on the direction of ruling on each legal claim made in the first 450 WTO disputes. The results show that litigants are significantly more likely to settle early given the presence of previous legal decisions
Affect (linguistics · Business · Economics · Incentive · International law · International trade · Law and economics · Market economy · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Settlement (finance · Sociology · World trade · Global trade and economics · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Law · World Trade Organization Law
The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court
A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law
Social construction and integration
Investment Treaties and General International Law
The European Parliament before the bench
The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union
International Courts as Agents of Legal Change
Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change
Precedent in International Courts
Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints
Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Three's a Crowd
Joining the Club
The Genealogy of Law
Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations
When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings
Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade
Introduction
The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design
Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes
The Concept of Legalization
On compliance
Delegation to International Organizations
Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence
Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining
The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization
Defining Accountability Up
Domestic Capacity and the Implementation Gap in Regional Trade Agreements
Measuring the Cost of Privacy
Does WTO Dispute Settlement Enforce or Inform
Democratic differences
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations
Why Do Nations Obey International Law
Stability and Rigidity
Efficient Secrecy
Optimal Obfuscation
The Politics of Precedent in International Law
International Law and State Behavior
| Citations per year | 0.8 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |