Fools and Knaves

Reflections on Locke's Theory of Philosophical Discourse

Bibliographic Data

ID6399381
AuthorsMichael P Zuckert (corresponding author)
Year1974
Volume36
Issue4
Pages544-564
Publication date1974-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Review of Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-6705 • E-ISSN: 1748-6858
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s003467050002427x
OpenAlexW2067289958
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited9

Ever since Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson, at almost the same moment, challenged the received view of Locke with their novel interpretations of his political philosophy, the question of how Locke wrote, and therefore of how he is to be read, has been prominent in most discussions of Locke. Strauss brought the issue to the fore by arguing the thesis that Locke engaged in “esoteric writing,” that is, that he intentionally said things he did not believe and sometimes withheld things he did, for the purpose of securing both his own safety and the greater likelihood of success of his philosophic project. Needless to say for so bold a claim, the Strauss thesis has not gone unopposed. Sharp issue has been taken both with the claim about Locke's esotericism and more substantively with the philosophic position Strauss attributes to Locke. It is clear that the two issues are intimately connected: the kind of “Locke” one finds depends to a very great extent on the kind of hermeneutical principles one adopts in approaching his work

Epistemology · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

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