Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6420359 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tim Schnelle (0009-0002-4469-8837, Universität Hamburg, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 376-399 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-07-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Constitutional Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1572-9966 • E-ISSN: 1043-4062 |
| Editora | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10602-024-09444-1 |
| OpenAlex | W4401027233 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 57 |
It has often been claimed that if constitutions are not complied with, they will be changed. Because an ineffective constitutional contract is a bad contract, a lack of enforcement should induce constitutional reform. This paper empirically tests this conjecture based on a dataset of 170 countries from 1950 to 2018. The results indicate that the size of the de jure/de facto gap has no effect on the likelihood of constitutional change as such. However, after differentiating between amendments and replacements as distinct modes of constitutional reform, the results imply that non-compliance robustly increases the probability of constitutional replacement only. This relationship is primarily driven by an implementation gap regarding political and civil rights. Expected moderating effects of interpersonal trust and civil society organizations as catalysts for successful civil reform movements cannot be empirically supported. Overall, this has important consequences for the writers of future constitutions. If reformers desire longevity for their new constitutional framework, they must be aware that utopian promises may backfire by provoking a quick replacement of their rules
Civil rights · Compliance (psychology · Constitution · Constitutional law · Constitutional right · De facto · Economics · Enforcement · Interpersonal communication · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Economic growth and judicial independence
What makes democracy work?
V-Dem Codebook v14
Regime types and regime change
Sham Constitutions
Verfassungspolitische Konjunkturzyklen? Überlegungen zur Wirkungsweise konstitutioneller Rigidität
Perception vs. experience
Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance
Beyond Window Dressing
The Logic of Collective Action
Constitutional stability
Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter
The Politics of Imperfection
Militant constitutionalism
How not to write a constitution
Different goods, different effects
Constitutionalism
The nation-state foundations of constitutional compliance
How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity
Constitutional Rigidity Matters
A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution
Is Revolution Individually Rational
Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process
The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Replacing and Amending Constitutions
How General Is Trust in "Most People"? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment
Ulysses Unbound
Changing the Rules
Social Trust and Fractionalization
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |