Risk diversification and vote decisions in mixed-member electoral systems

Bibliographic Data

ID6446709
AuthorsSusumu Shikano (0000-0003-4087-2789), Erik S Herron (0000-0002-6263-6464)
Year2025
Volume204
Issue1-2
Pages203-219
Publication date2025-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePublic Choice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11127-025-01301-5
OpenAlexW4411875197
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

This paper builds on the literature about mixed-member electoral systems, exploring how ballot design interacts with voter behavior. We present a theoretical model for vote decision-making in mixed-member systems that takes into account the interaction between both tiers. The model is grounded in a spatial model for vote decision-making under risk and inspired by the logic of portfolio diversification under risk. Accordingly, voters are modeled as risk-averse decision-makers who may prefer diversified vote packages (i.e. split-ticket) when party and candidate uncertainties are highly correlated. The risk diversification strategy abates when voters cast their votes sequentially. This finding provides a potential explanation for the impact of vote sequence in mixed-member systems, an under-investigated topic in the literature. It thus links the established literature on mixed-member systems with scholarship on ballot design and its effects. Additionally, the paper’s analysis explores the implications of combining the proposed model with the well-established wasted vote model

Business · Diversification (marketing strategy · Economics · Law and economics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Public economics · Public finance · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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