For Reputation's Sake
Shifts in Corporate Political Activity After the Capitol Insurrection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6447017 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Cohen (0000-0002-5271-6700, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 477-512 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Publisher | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00024128 |
| OpenAlex | W7104041607 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 75 |
How did firms adjust their corporate political activity (CPA) in response to the January 6th Capitol Insurrection? Through a longitudinal study of campaign contributions from Fortune 500 companies’ political action committees to members of Congress, I estimate the size and duration of corporate penalties toward legislators who objected to the 2020 election results. Using a Difference-in-Differences design, I find a sharp but declining penalty against election deniers in the 2022 and 2024 election cycles. While firms that pledged to cut off their contributions did so to the greatest degree, I find evidence of this behavior across most large corporations. I suggest that corporate social responsibility and concerns over public reputation shape corporate responsiveness to political shocks like January 6th, and show that more visible corporations were more likely to keep their distance from election deniers. These findings emphasize the important trade-off between access-seeking behavior and public reputation in the corporate response to political controversies, and in CPA more generally
American political science · Electoral politics · International relations · Politics · Academic Freedom and Politics · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective
A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance
The Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy And Shareholder Wealth
Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility
Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
Corporate Citizenship
Corporate accountability and the politics of visibility in ‘late modernity’
Campaign Finance and Policymaking
Can Stakeholders Mobilize Businesses for the Protection of Democracy? Evidence from the U.S. Capitol Insurrection
The Effects of Citizens United on Corporate Spending in the 2012 Presidential Election
The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity
Corporate and Labor PAC Contributions in House Elections
Money in Exile
The Financial Incumbency Advantage
Why Do Some Firms Give? Why Do Some Give a Lot
Quid Pro Quo? Corporate Returns to Campaign Contributions
Goals & Strategies of Political Action Committees
Do Unions Punish Democrats? Free-Trade Votes and Labor PAC Contributions, 1999–2012
The Impact of Citizens United on Large Corporations and Their Employees
Donation Motivations
Wielding the Stick Instead of the Carrot
The Relationship Between Political Parties and Interest Groups
Campaign Contributions, Access, and Government Contracting
A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes
An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Lobbying and Taxes
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials
Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract
PACs and the Congressional Supermarket
Corporate Political Strategies
Constituency Influence in Congress
The Butterfly Did It
Buying Time
Legislators and Interest Groups
Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |