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How to entrap your protector

Reassessing entrapment in light of the Crimean War crisis

Bibliographic Data

ID6449225
AuthorsTudor A Onea (0000-0002-4644-0541, Bilkent University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume51
Issue4
Pages628-648
Publication date2024-11-26
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReview of International Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0260-2105 • E-ISSN: 1469-9044
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0260210524000731
OpenAlexW4404730937
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited3

Recent scholarship often dismisses entrapment, arguing that there are hardly any identifiable cases; and that powerful states (protectors) can sidestep it by narrowing the treaty conditions under which they have to intervene to defend their weaker allies (protégés). Consequently, alliances and partnerships are nearly always considered risk-free assets. However, this paper argues that several types of entrapment are present. The paper is foremost concerned with classic entrapment, a type referring to a purposeful effort by the protégé to drag the protector into a conflict serving primarily the protégé’s interests. The protégé entraps the protector by placing itself deliberately in danger of defeat and by manipulating the protector’s domestic audience costs. Classic entrapment is likely to succeed under two conditions: (a) when the protégé’s allegiance confers the protector an advantage in a competition against other powerful states; and (b) in informal arrangements, in which there is no clear cut-off point to the protector’s commitment. The paper provides an illustration in the Ottoman Empire’s entrapment of Britain in the crisis preceding the Crimean War. The conclusion considers classic entrapment’s feasibility in present world politics, particularly in the context of Taiwan

Allegiance · Competition (biology · Context (archaeology · Entrapment · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Scholarship · Sociology · Treaty · History · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

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Citations per year2.5
Citation span2024 - 2026 (3)
Highly citedNo

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