The knowability paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6544680 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan L Kvanvig (0000-0002-0355-1196) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Pages | 226 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | The knowability paradox (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press Inc. (PUBLISHER) |
| OpenAlex | W1512028330 |
| Open Library | OL22721376M |
| ISBN | 9780199282593 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 56 |
"The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to express that idea than to maintain that all truths are knowable? In the face of the paradox, however, such a characterization threatens to undermine antirealism. If Fitch's proof is valid, then one can be an antirealist of this sort only by endorsing the conclusion of the proof that all truths are known."--BOOK JACKET
Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Paradox · Theory of knowledge
Laws and Symmetry
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
Warrant
On Quantifier Domain Restriction
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
A logical analysis of some value concepts
Conclusive reasons
Two notions of necessity
Epistemic Operators
Putting Skeptics in their Place
On Knowledge of the Unknowable
Reason, Truth and History
A Counterexample to Modus Ponens
Elusive knowledge
How to be a Fallibilist
Realism and logic
Who, Me
Solving the Skeptical Problem
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
Knowability and Constructivism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |