Securities against misrule

Juries, Assemblies, Elections

Bibliographic Data

ID6573650
AuthorsJon Elster (0000-0002-9543-1780)
Year2013
Pages324
Publication date2013-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueSecurities against misrule (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherCambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1017/cbo9781139382762
ISBN9781139382762
Open LibraryOL25361514M
LanguageEN
Citations received47

This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham,Ŵs views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies, and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics, and law

Abuse of administrative power · Decision-making · Group Decision Making · History & Theory · Political science · Prevention · Representative government and representation · Administrative discretion · Decision making · Group decision making · Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)