Zum Verhältnis von rezeptivem und praktischem Wissen
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7103475 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Mcdowell (0009-0004-1645-4653, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-1045 • E-ISSN: 2192-1482 |
| Publisher | KaDeMiE-VErLaG (PUBLISHER • DD) |
| DOI | 10.1524/dzph.2013.0032 |
| OpenAlex | W2332664003 |
| Language | DE |
| Citations received | 2 |
According to G. E. M. Anscombe, practical knowledge, an agent’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing, is not contemplative or speculative; it does not owe its being knowledge to its being derived from what it knows. She argues for this on the ground that practical knowledge can be one of “two knowledges of the same thing”, where the other of the two is speculative. If we try to conceive practical knowledge as speculative, we fall into a hopeless picture in which practical knowledge is provided by “a queer and special seeing eye in the middle of the acting”. I take Anscombe’s thought to be this: practical knowledge is knowledge concerning a happening that the agent may also know speculatively is her doing. I argue that this thesis is not threatened by the possibility of cases in which a happening that the agent knows as her doing would not be available to her to know as her doing if she did not know it speculatively
Contemplation · Epistemology · Happening · German Social Sciences and History · History · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |