Intentions, Intending, and Belief
Noninferential Weak Cognitivism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21507937 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Clark (Department of Philosophy University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 308-327 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Pacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/papq.12308 |
| OpenAlex | W3011821939 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Noncognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls noninferential weak cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders
Cognition · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |