Philip Clark
Biographic Data
| ID | 3698495 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philip Clark |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philip |
| FAMILY NAME | Clark |
| SIGNATURE | CLARK P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Avery Hill College of Education London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Intentions, Intending, and Belief
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Noncognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls noninferential weak cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no promine…
A Metaphysics for Freedom
Steward's book is an attempt to reorient the discussion of free will. Traditionally, the question has been what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility, and the focus has been on humans. There has been little discussion of the freedom of such things as sharks and bats. One might defend this restriction on the ground that nonhuman animals do not have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. If that is the kind of freedom…
Appearances of the Good and Appearances of the True
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Compensatory Education
No prominent works on this page.
Compensatory Education
Appearances of the Good and Appearances of the True
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
A Metaphysics for Freedom
Steward's book is an attempt to reorient the discussion of free will. Traditionally, the question has been what kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility, and the focus has been on humans. There has been little discussion of the freedom of such things as sharks and bats. One might defend this restriction on the ground that nonhuman animals do not have the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. If that is the kind of freedom…
Intentions, Intending, and Belief
Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Noncognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls noninferential weak cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no promine…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Cognition (1 work) · Compensatory education (1 work) · Contemporary philosophy (1 work) · Education Systems and Policy (1 work) · Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work)