Soft Balancing, Binding or Bandwagoning? Understanding Institutional Responses to Power Disparities in the Americas

Bibliographic Data

ID7270949
AuthorsLaura Levick (0000-0002-3049-6591, St. Thomas University, corresponding author), Carsten-Andreas Schulz (0000-0001-5926-5271, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
Year2020
Volume53
Issue3
Pages521-539
Publication date2020-06-10
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCanadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0008423920000220
OpenAlexW3035379650
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited63

What strategies will states pursue in managing their relations with more powerful neighbours? International Relations scholarship identifies a wide range of policy options open to “secondary states,” including soft balancing, bandwagoning and institutional binding. We provide a conceptual framework to distinguish between these similar and often conflated institutional strategies on the basis of two dimensions: threat perception and inclusiveness. We then apply this framework to the inter-American system. Analyzing original data on treaty action between 1946 and 2015, we find that secondary states’ adherence to multilateral agreements increases when the United States participates and when states do not perceive the hegemon to be a threat. These findings suggest that institutional binding captures the dynamics of inter-American cooperation more adequately than either soft balancing or bandwagoning: states balance against perceived threats but bind their friends

Action (physics · Conflation · Economics · Hegemony · International trade · Perception · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Scholarship · Treaty · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology

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Open DOIOpen Access