Nixon's Nuclear Specter
The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7306397 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Dumbrell (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 536-537 |
| Publication date | 2016-08-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of American History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-8723 • E-ISSN: 1945-2314 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jahist/jaw296 |
| OpenAlex | W2811191946 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
In this original and meticulously researched study, William Burr and Jeffrey P. Kimball unravel the nuclear diplomacy—in effect, a species of nuclear “signaling” to Moscow—associated with White House efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War in the first year of the Richard M. Nixon presidency. In outline terms, Nixon, abetted by Henry Kissinger, drew on earlier Cold War “brinksmanship” experiences in an attempt to pressure Moscow (and in turn Hanoi) into accepting U.S. negotiating terms, preferably before a Washington-imposed deadline of November 1, 1969. The strategy encompassed elements of the escalatory Operation Duck Hook, which, at one stage of planning, had included the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It also included “secret” bombing raids over Cambodia, as well as various threats, diplomatic encounters, and indications that extensive mining operations in North Vietnam were about to be launched. An escalatory bombing and mining offensive was, in fact, abandoned in early October, largely due to the anticipated U.S. domestic reaction, and because of the skepticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The eventual nuclear alert took place, probably without the full knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Earle Wheeler, between October 13 and October 30. It was intended to fool Moscow and Hanoi into thinking that a wider escalation (in effect, the aborted Operation Duck Hook) would follow unless concessions were made in the negotiating process. Moscow and Hanoi failed to respond to the event
Diplomacy · Economic history · EPIC · Negotiation · Nuclear weapon · Offensive · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Presidency · Skepticism · Vietnam War · White (mutation · Engineering · History · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Twentieth Century Scientific Developments
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |