Narrative Ethics and Vulnerability

Kristeva and Ricoeur on Interdependence

Bibliographic Data

ID7315212
AuthorsElizabeth Purcell (Boston College, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume21
Issue1
Pages43-59
Publication date2013-05-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of French and Francophone Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2155-1162 • E-ISSN: 2155-1162
PublisherUniversity Library System, University of Pittsburgh (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5195/jffp.2013.575
OpenAlexW2088322130
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited4

The character and extent of disabilities, especially cognitive disability, have posed significance problems for existing moral theories. Certain philosophers have even questioned the moral personhood of people with disabilities and have argued that people with profound cognitive impairments should not be granted the same moral status as those who are cognitively able-bodied. This paper proposes an alternative understanding of moral personhood as relational rather than individuated. This relational moral personhood finds its foundation in the clinical practice and psychoanalysis of Julia Kristeva and the hermeneutic narrative identity of Paul Ricoeur. One consequence of this relational personhood is a new understanding of moral status through narrative co-authorship rather than intellectual or social capacity. Another consequence is a refiguration of narrative identity as narrative interdependence

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Identity (music · Moral disengagement · Narrative · Narrative identity · Narrative inquiry · Personhood · Psychoanalysis · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Vulnerability (computing · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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