Trustee strategies, politicization and de‐delegation
The case of the European Central Bank
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7785997 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tobias Tesche (0000-0003-2213-7051, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences University of Amsterdam Amsterdam the Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 125-140 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/gove.12755 |
| OpenAlex | W4312115693 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 44 |
This article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de‐delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de‐delegation: (i) dualism , (ii) voluntary self‐restraint , and (iii) changing the yard stick . It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de‐delegation
Business · Centrality · Corporate governance · De facto · Delegation · Economics · Financial system · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · European Union Policy and Governance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Public Administration · Finance
Puzzling or powering? How fiscal communication reflects the politicisation of the European Central Bank
Defining Price Stability
Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy
Monetary‐Fiscal Interactions and the Problem of Outdated Commitments
Design‐Based Politicization in Non‐Majoritarian Institutions
Actions Speak Louder Than Words
The European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism
Do appointing institutions influence monetary policy? Evidence from voting patterns in the Polish Monetary Policy Council
The ECB and the inflation monsters
Reversing delegation? Politicization, de‐delegation, and non‐majoritarian institutions
The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity
The Euro and the Battle of Ideas
How agents matter
Introduction
The Politicisation of the European Central Bank and the Bundestag
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court
Supranational agency and indirect governance after the Euro crisis
Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone
Keep it complex! Prodi’s curse and the EU fiscal governance regime complex
The Myth of Market Neutrality
Technocratic Keynesianism
Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis
Sworn to Grim Necessity? Imperfections of European Economic Governance, Normative Political Theory, and Supreme Emergency
Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit
The EMU’s Legitimacy and the ECB as a Strategic Political Player in the Crisis Context
Political leadership of the European Central Bank
Sui generis no more? The ECB’s second decade
Rules Rather than Discretion
Reinterpreting the rules ‘by stealth’ in times of crisis
Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited
When Is It Rational to Learn the Wrong Lessons? Technocratic Authority, Social Learning, and Euro Fragility
Democracy in the age of the euro
The politics of the European Central Bank
The ECB's Monetary Dialogue with the European Parliament
Contested governance
Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis
Banking Union as Holy Grail
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Rational Fictions
Competence versus control
The ECB and the Stability Pact
Let's speak more? How the ECB responds to public contestation
Two Logics of Delegation
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |