Which institutions for post-war Europe? Explaining the institutional design of Europe's first community
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7880971 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Berthold Rittberger (0000-0002-8806-6455, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 673-708 |
| Publication date | 2001-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501760110083464 |
| OpenAlex | W1989746757 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 30 |
This article addresses a question that has been vastly ignored by the political science community and the literature on institutional/constitutional choice and delegation in European politics in particular: why is the European Union governed by a specific set of institutions comprising a Commission, Parliament, Court and Council of Ministers? By linking member states' preferences for co-operation to their preferences for institutions, this article provides an explanation of why the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community opted for a particular institutional set-up that included elements novel to the practice and study of international co-operation, i.e. supranationality and a nascent form of popular representation. It will be argued that the states' underlying economic and status- or security-related preferences for co-operation correlate with different rationales for institution-building. With regard to economic preferences, the logic of institution-building will follow instrumental calculations about the expected distributional consequences of institutional arrangements whereas status- or security-related preferences correlate with considerations of 'appropriateness' given uncertainty about the distributive implications of institutions. This article will therefore show that norm-driven and methodological individualist approaches to explain institution-building need not be mutually exclusive but can be considered as complementary. Keywords: European Coal And Steel CommunityInstitutional DesignNational Preference Formation
Delegation · Economics · European union · Individualism · Institution · International trade · Law and economics · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · European Union Policy and Governance · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration
L’autonomisation du « Parlement européen
Active European Union Influence
Passive European Union Influence
Robustness Checks
European Union Diffusion and Other Regional Organizations
Revisiting Regional Institution Building
Explaining the European Union’s Interorganizational Influence on Other Regional Organizations
The Scope of European Union Influence
Theorizing Interorganizational Influence from the European Union
The Dependent Variable ‘RO institutionalization’
Summary Statistics
Interorganizational Diffusion in International Relations
The Engines of European Integration
La parlamentarización del sistema político de la Unión Europea
Negotiating the European Defence Community
La présidence du Conseil
Coping with the Lilliput syndrom large vs. small member states in the European convention
The Reform of the Council Presidency
Why call it a ‘European Community’? Ideological Continuities and Institutional Design of Nascent European Organisations
Change and Stability of the EU Institutional System
Accountability and Personalisation of the European Council Presidency
The fourth face of legitimacy
La convention européenne
No integration without representation!’ European integration, parliamentary democracy, and two forgotten Communities
The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament
The Genesis of European Rights
Motion, Container and Equilibrium
The historical origins of the EU's system of representation
Explaining the EU’s policy shift toward China
The deliberative turn in integration theory
Starting from scratch? Analysing early institutionalization processes
The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of Institutions — Revisiting Historical Institutionalism
Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik
National Interests in International Society
The Federal Vision
Institutions and Social Conflict
After Victory
After Hegemony
Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955
Theories of International Regimes
The Governance Problem in International Relations
Ideas and Foreign Policy
Games Real Actors Play
Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955
The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the neo-realist research programme
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation
After victory
Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam
Optimality and Authority
Which norms matter? Revisiting the “failure” of internationalism
Taking Preferences Seriously
The Political Structure of Constitution Making
Bargaining and Constitutional Contracts
Constitutional Politics in International Relations
Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,39 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2024 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |