Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II

Bibliographic Data

ID7956911
AuthorsC Kyriacou (0000-0002-1506-1602, University of Cyprus, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume16
Issue10
Publication date2021-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12739
OpenAlexW3178001113
LanguageEN
References cited41

I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditional. On the non‐traditional side are fallibilist science‐based skepticism (which relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge) and practical skepticism (which questions the intellectual character of the standard of knowledge) and on the traditional side high‐standard/infallibilist. I then briefly present and discuss representatives of each category

Epistemology · Extant taxon · Skepticism · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology

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