Government termination in Europe
A Sensitivity Analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8041517 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Walther (0000-0001-8805-6161, Umeå University), Johan Hellström (0000-0002-6613-4242, Umeå University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 591-611 |
| Publication date | 2021-02-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402382.2021.1880720 |
| OpenAlex | W3129443507 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 48 |
The aim of this article is to examine which factors robustly influence cabinet duration in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In this respect the article investigates the role political institutions (including vote of no-confidence procedures), parliamentary and cabinet attributes, and various contextual factors have on cabinet stability. By using a type of sensitivity analysis (i.e. Extreme Bounds Analysis) on a panel of about 180 cabinets in CEE, it is possible to examine which factors consistently predict the probability of government survival. It is found that only a few factors are robust to alternative model specifications, namely: government type, fragmentation in parliament, the level of unemployment, and restrictive no-confidence votes procedures which make it more difficult for the opposition to bring down a government. Thus, the results indicate that cabinet duration in CEE is not primarily affected by sui generis factors to the region, but by factors of more general relevance
Cabinet (room · Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Geography · Government (linguistics · Lower house · Macroeconomics · Opposition (politics · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Unemployment · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe
Determinants of government duration
Indirect executive accountability of prime ministers
Constrainers vs Enablers
The potential impact of the Italian ‘premierato’ reform on cabinet durability
Friendly foes or enemies within? Assessing the (in)stability of coalition governments with populists in Europe
The vote of no confidence
Parliaments and government termination
Foreign Military Intervention and Cabinet Government Stability
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998)
Robustness Tests for Quantitative Research
Determinants of Long-Term Growth
Institutions, Chance, and Choices
Regression Models and Life-Tables
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Event History Modeling
Predictive inference with random forests
Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central Eastern Europe
Empirical determinants of corruption
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants
Party Systems and Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe
Party System Polarisation and Government Duration in Central and Eastern Europe
The Political Economy and the Durability of European Coalition Cabinets
Survival of the Fittest? Cabinet Duration in Postcommunist Europe
Does the Iron Curtain Still Exist? The Convergence in Electoral Volatility between Eastern and Western Europe
Early Marriages Last Longer
On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe
Communist successor parties and government survival in Central Eastern Europe
Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies compared
Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies
Hyperaccountability
Political Polarization and Cabinet Stability in Multiparty Systems
Constitutional Power and Competing Risks
Government instability and the state
Stability through control? The influence of coalition agreements on the stability of coalition cabinets
The vote of no confidence
The effect of the constructive vote of no-confidence on government termination and government durability
Bayesian Model Averaging
Context and Coalition-Bargaining
Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government
Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion
How is Government Stability Affected by the State of the Economy? Payoff Structures, Government Type and Economic State
The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States
Effective” Number of Parties
The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems
Government Termination
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
Modelling Cabinet Durability and Termination
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |