Government instability and the state
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6445301 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Walther (0000-0001-8805-6161), Johan Hellström (0000-0002-6613-4242), Torbjörn Bergman (0000-0001-6772-7253) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 579-594 |
| Publication date | 2018-05-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/psrm.2018.20 |
| OpenAlex | W2606276915 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 38 |
Government instability (cabinet duration) is an important feature of parliamentary democracy. Over time, the research on cabinet duration has improved in technical and theoretical sophistication. However, we note that little attention has been paid to the relationship between governments and the state itself. Our main hypothesis is that state capacity, e.g., factors such as state bureaucratic effectiveness and law and order, shape how easy it is for governments to implement the new policy and thus how well they can achieve policy objectives. We also argue that when state capacity is low, the ability to adequately respond to external shocks goes down, and instability increases. When testing this empirically we find that low state capacity does indeed help us predict an increased risk for early termination—in particular, whether the government ends through a replacement (but not by an early election). Using interaction effects, we also demonstrate that the effect of external shocks, such as an increase in unemployment, is conditional on state capacity. An increase in unemployment only has a significant effect on cabinet stability when state capacity is low, suggesting that the cabinet’s (in)ability to address the economic problems is an important factor for understating cabinet durability
Bureaucracy · Cabinet (room · Economics · Government (linguistics · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Political science · Sociology · Sophistication · Unemployment · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Coalitions in Parliamentary Government
The Quality of Government
Policy, Office, or Votes?
Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining
Interaction Effects in Multiple Regression
Institutions, Chance, and Choices
Governance Indicators
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Seize the state, seize the day
Event History Modeling
Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central Eastern Europe
Unpacking the Strength of the State
Communist successor parties and government survival in Central Eastern Europe
Hyperaccountability
Constitutional Power and Competing Risks
Government Selection and Executive Powers
Corruption, Bureaucratic Failure and Social Policy Priorities
Understanding Interaction Models
The Political Economy of State Capture in CentralEurope
The state-democracy nexus
An “Events” Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability
Government Termination
The Process of Cabinet Dissolution
A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies
The Cabinet Stability Controversy
Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival
Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies
The State and Social Capital
Quality of Government
What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events
Party Systems and Government Stability
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |