Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8068922 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sergio Tenenbaum (0000-0002-5449-7513, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 163-176 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2019.1599053 |
| OpenAlex | W2945331659 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 26 |
Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot provide an adequate account of the relation between the constitutive norms of agency and the particular ends the agent pursues. I then provide a broad outline of an interpretation of Kant’s formalism that is immune to this objection. I conclude that constitutivism is best understood as the upshot of a formalist view of categorical practical principles
Agency (philosophy · Categorical imperative · Epistemology · Formalism (music · Interpretation (philosophy · Morality · Relation (database · Worry · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Philosophy
Two Sorts of Constitutivism
Does MacIntyre's Moral Sociology Presuppose a Personalist Moral Psychology? MacIntyre and Tomasello on Moral Psychology
Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy
Kant, Constitutivism, and the Shmagency Objection
Kant-Bibliographie 2019
How to Be a Constitutivist
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy
Kant's Reason
Critique of Pure Reason
Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
How We Get Along
Why Be Rational?
Shmagency Revisited
The Sources of Normativity
Being Realistic about Reasons
Agency, Shmagency
Agency, Shmagency
On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
Friendship and Moral Danger
Agency and the Foundations of Ethics
Self-Constitution
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |