Action as the Conclusion of Practical Reasoning; The Critique of a Rödlian Account
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8072159 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Evgenia Mylonaki (0000-0002-0341-0270, Hellenic Open University Greece and College Year in Athens, CYA Greece, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 30-45 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-23 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12175 |
| OpenAlex | W2584573106 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 9 |
In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo‐Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning's practicality (that it brings about action) and its rationality (that it is subject to thought governing norms) in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account—an account which grants Rödl's central theses—fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo‐Aristotelian accounts alike
Action (physics · Analytic reasoning · Cognitive science · Common sense · Deductive reasoning · Economics · Epistemology · Management · Practical reason · Rationality · Subject (documents · Task (project management · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2023 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |