In the beginning was the doing
The Premises of the Practical Syllogism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8074135 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Wiland (0000-0002-8211-142X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 303-321 |
| Publication date | 2013-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00455091.2013.857139 |
| OpenAlex | W1842765192 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 13 |
If practical reasoning deserves its name, its form must be different from that of ordinary (theoretical) reasoning. A few have thought that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, rather than a mental state. I argue here that if the conclusion is an action, then so too is one of the premises. You might reason your way from doing one thing to doing another: from browsing journal abstracts to reading a particular journal article. I motivate this by sympathetically re-examining Hume's claim that a conclusion about what ought to be done follows only from an argument one of whose premises is likewise about what ought to be done
Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Linguistics · Political science · Practical reason · Premises · Reading (process · Syllogism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.56 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2021 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |