The Value of Existence

Bibliographic Data

ID8081691
AuthorsGustaf Arrhenius (0000-0001-5031-505X, corresponding author), Włodek Rabinowicz (0000-0001-5910-0258)
EditorsIwao Hirose (0000-0002-8279-956X), Jonas Olson (0000-0001-8323-9882)
Year2015
Publication date2015-04-07
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueOxford Handbook of Value Theory (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.013.0023
OpenAlexW1841614187
ISBN9780199959303
LanguageEN
Citations received19

Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another only if it is better for someone, and that only moral theories that are in this sense “person affecting” can be correct. The implications of this Person-Affecting Restriction will differ radically, however, depending on which answer one gives to the existential question. The negative answer, which we argue against, would make the restriction quite untenable. Hence, many of the problems regarding our moral duties to future generations turn around the issue at hand

Counterintuitive · Epistemology · Existentialism · Moral philosophy · Sociology · Utilitarianism · Value (mathematics · Value theory · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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