Kant on Judging and the Will
Perception, Reason, and the Self
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8086338 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Stephenson (0000-0003-4590-1307), Jill Vance Buroker (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Pages | 288 |
| Publication date | 2017-07-20 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Kant and the Philosophy of Mind (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0011 |
| OpenAlex | W4243982928 |
| ISBN | 9780198724957 |
| Open Library | OL27415890M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason
Economics · Epistemology · Perception · Position (finance · Practical reason · Relation (database · Voluntarism (philosophy · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Congresses · immanuel Kant (1724-1804) · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |