Hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science

Bibliographic Data

ID8086354
AuthorsAndrew Cooper (0000-0003-4972-8812, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume99
Pages97-105
Publication date2022-05-16
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueStudies in History and Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0039-3681 • E-ISSN: 1879-2510
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.04.007
PMID35585000
OpenAlexW4280639834
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited17

In this paper I extend the case for a necessitation account of particular laws in Kant's philosophy of science by examining the relation between reason's hypothetical use in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the legitimate hypotheses identified in the Doctrine of Method. Building on normative accounts of reason's ideas, I argue that reason's hypothetical use does not describe the connections between objects and their grounds, which lie beyond the reach of the understanding, but merely prescribes the relations between appearances and their conditions, for which the understanding must seek. A legitimate hypothesis, I suggest, is a proposition we hold to be true that fills in one or several of those relations. The problematic character of hypotheses requires that we evaluate our reasons for holding them to be true. While natural modality is grounded in the nature of things, which cannot be fully known, our reasons for assent can and must be grounded on features of objects that are epistemically available to us

Character (mathematics · Dialectic · Doctrine · Epistemology · Normative · Philosophy of science · Proposition · Relation (database · Sociology · Transcendental number · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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