We Make Up the Rules as We Go Along
Improvisation as an Essential Aspect of Human Practices
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8095609 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alessandro Bertinetto (0000-0002-0296-9291, University of Turin , Turin , Italy, corresponding author), Georg W Bertram (Freie Universität Berlin , Berlin , Germany) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 202-221 |
| Publication date | 2020-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Open Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2543-8875 • E-ISSN: 2543-8875 |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/opphil-2020-0012 |
| OpenAlex | W3032980608 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 29 |
The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo . Second, it is necessary to solve the theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself
Cognitive science · Dimension (graph theory · Epistemology · Habit · Improvisation · Rationality · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Philosophy · Social Psychology
Saying Something
Literal Meaning
German Philosophy 1760–1860
Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation
The Sources of Normativity
Towards a Conflict Theory of Recognition
A Philosophy of Material Culture
Autopoiesis and Cognition
Hidden principles of improvisation
Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism
Two Conceptions of Second Nature
The Normativity of Rationality
Never improvise improvisation
Creativity, Habit, and the Social Products of Creative Action
Speech Acts
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |