Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8096485
AutoresKrister Bykvist (0000-0003-4370-7201, autor de correspondencia)
Año2010
Volumen26
Número1
Páginas1-26
Fecha de publicación2010-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomics and Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0266-2671 • E-ISSN: 1474-0028
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0266267110000039
OpenAlexW2128554356
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas18

How do we determine the well-being of a person when her preferences are not stable across worlds? Suppose, for instance, that you are considering getting married, and that you know that if you get married, you will prefer being unmarried, and that if you stay unmarried, you will prefer being married. The general problem is to find a stable standard of well-being when the standard is set by preferences that are not stable. In this paper, I shall show that the problem is even worse: inconsistency threatens if we accept both that your desires determine what is good for you and that you must prefer what is better for you. After I have introduced a useful toy model and stated the inconsistency argument, I will go on to discuss a couple of unsuccessful theories and see what we can learn from their mistakes. One important lesson is that how you would have felt about a life had you never led it is irrelevant to the question of how good that life is for you. What counts is how you feel about your life when you are actually leading it. Another lesson is that a life can be better for you even if you would not rank it higher, if you were to lead it

Argument (complex analysis · Rank (graph theory · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Social Psychology