The Substance View

A Critique

Bibliographic Data

ID8106433
AuthorsRob Lovering (0000-0003-3696-2466, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume27
Issue5
Pages263-270
Publication date2012-02-02
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBioethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0269-9702 • E-ISSN: 1467-8519
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01954.x
PMID22296684
OpenAlexW1560225563
LanguageEN
Citations received5

According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the 'substance view,' what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency - a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things - the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies - one must have a better understanding of the substance view (in particular, its understanding of rational moral agency) as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense

Agency (philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Intrinsic value (animal ethics · Moral agency · Possession (linguistics · Prima facie · Property (philosophy · Reductio ad absurdum · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophy

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