Kantian constructivism and the authority of others

Bibliographic Data

ID8106571
AuthorsAleksy Tarasenko‐Struc (corresponding author), Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc (0000-0003-2706-4568, Department of Philosophy Michigan State University East Lansing Michigan)
Year2019
Volume28
Issue1
Pages77-92
Publication date2019-01-06
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12426
OpenAlexW2910704212
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited27

I argue that Christine Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism cannot accommodate our obligations to others. Because she holds that all of our obligations are grounded in our obligating ourselves, she is committed to the view that our obligations to others are grounded in corresponding obligations to ourselves. Yet this conclusion is objectionable on substantive moral grounds. The problem is that she embraces an egocentric conception of authority, on which we originally have the authority to obligate ourselves whereas others only have the authority to obligate us because we grant it to them. The solution is to adopt a more thoroughly social conception of authority and autonomy

Autonomy · Constructivism (international relations · Epistemology · International relations · Obligate · Political science · Politics · Social constructivism · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub