Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality

Bibliographic Data

ID8398299
AuthorsJennifer Nado (0000-0003-1680-2975, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume59
Issue4
Pages709-731
Publication date2008-12-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axn035
OpenAlexW2004598430
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited21

Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggesting that intentionality ascription can be affected by moral factors. I argue that the explanation for these phenomena lies in the workings of a tacit moral judgment mechanism, capable under certain circumstances of altering normal intentionality ascriptions. This view contrasts with that of Knobe ([2006]), who argues that the findings show that the concept of intentional action invokes evaluative notions. I discuss and reject possible objections to the moral mechanism view, and offer arguments supporting the model over Knobe's account on grounds of simplicity and plausibility.1. Introduction2. The Competence Hypothesis3. The Performance Response4. Moral Mechanism Interference5. Blame or Valence?

Action (physics) · Ascription · Blame · Epistemology · Intentionality · Mechanism (biology) · Moral disengagement · Simplicity · Social cognitive theory of morality · Ethics in Business and Education · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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